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1. Introduction 
 
This volume builds on and explores a long tradition that maintains that many 
of our useful and prized laws in science hold only ceteris paribus. The claim 
recorded in the usual rendering of such laws is true only under some special 
conditions, to which the cp-clause refers. The long-standing challenge is how 
to give meaning to the cp-clause without rendering the law claim vacuous. 
You will find many answers to this question in this volume1. There are also 
many who despair, arguing that the question cannot be answered and that we 
should give up on cp-laws2. 
 
Our contribution to an answer builds upon a long-standing claim of Cartwright: 
Most of the regularities that get represented as ‘laws’ in our sciences arise 
from, and are to be found regularly associated with, the successful operation 
of a nomological machine.3 This tells us immediately information that must be 
referred to in the cp-clause of one of these laws if the entire cp-claim is to be 
true:  whatever else must be added, we cannot do without reference to a 
nomological machine. We agree, for example, ‘Ceteris paribus aspirins cure 
headaches’, but insist that they can only do so when swallowed by someone 
with the right physiological makeup and a headache. So conditions strong 
enough to guarantee the successful operation of a nomological machine are a 
necessary component of a cp-clause if the entire law claim is to be true.  
 
Besides providing a necessary condition on the truth of the cp-law claim, 
recognising the nomological machine has great practical importance. This is 
what we aim to make clear here. For instance, referring to the nomological 
machine makes explicit where the regularities are to be found, which is of 
central importance to the use of cp-laws for prediction and manipulation. 
Equally important, bringing the nomological machine to the fore brings into 
focus the make-up  of the machine – its parts, their powers and their 
                                                 
 
1
 See e.g. the contributions from Andreas Hüttermann, Bernhard Nickel and Gerhard Schurz. 
2
 See e.g. Schiffer 1991; Earman, Roberts & Smith 2002; Woodward 2002. 
3
 See e.g. Cartwright 1989; Cartwright 1999. 
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arrangements - and its context case-by-case. We call this the ‘local ontology’ 
of the machine. The need to refer to what we call the nomological machine is 
widely recognised. For example, Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley’s 
famous text on methodology4 counts the description of the machine among 
the interaction variables that constitute a threat to the ‘external validity’ or 
‘generalisability’ of an experiment. These variables, they explain, ‘represent a 
potential specificity of the effects of X (the cause under test) to some 
undesirably limited set of conditions.'5 Those defending the use of causal 
Bayes nets for causal inference and discovery also address the need to 
condition causal claims to what turn out to be specific generating structures by 
adding additional variables to refer to those structures. These additional 
variables can for many purposes do the job of getting the causal claims right – 
they hold only when these new interaction variables take on the right values. 
On the other hand, they divert attention from the detailed make-up of the 
generating structure – the ontology of the nomological machine. And an 
account of the ontology is just what matters for many scientific practices. For 
instance, recognising the ontology of the machine provides a practical and 
principled basis for identifying possible disturbing factors, which are the 
central concern of so much of the cp literature. In the remainder of this paper 
we shall show how in this way, and in many others, getting a grip on the 
machine ontology is central to the methods of science and their success.   
 
To this end, in Section 2 we extend our previous explication of how 
regularities (recorded as cp-laws) arise from the repeated operation of 
nomological machines and show how some disturbances can be allowed for 
by extending the machine.  
 
Section 3 then provides examples that show how scientific practice 
recognises the nomological machine and its ontology, and how it recognises 
how the regularities which are recorded as cp-laws arise from the machine. 
We also look at what happens when we try to use cp-laws without sufficient 
regard to the nomological machine from which they come, citing errors which 
occur in the misapplication of randomised control trials (RCT’s).  
 
In Section 4 we show how the methods illustrated in Section 3 associate 
variabilities in the cp-regularities with aspects of the nomological machine 
ontology and its context. We show case-by-case how this knowledge allows 
science to use cp-laws as the basis of successful strategies.  
 
Section 5 outlines some implications for the practical use of cp-laws. 
 
Before we proceed we should note a few things we are not doing. First we are 
not offering truth conditions for claims of the form, ‘Ceteris paribus L’. Rather 
we  make a claim about one thing that ‘ceteris paribus’ must generally refer to 
if such a cp-law is to be true: the successful operation of a nomological 
machine. So, for the most part, our account of the cp-clause should 
                                                 
 
4
 Campbell & Stanley 1963. 
5
 Ibid p. 187. 
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supplement rather than conflict with other accounts. Second, we do not offer 
sufficient conditions the clause must refer to in order for the cp-claim to be 
true but only the general form of a necessary condition. We hope you will find 
in this volume further considerations that can allow the construction of a 
nearly sufficient condition. But we do want to stress that whatever is on offer, 
if it is not strong enough to imply the successful operation of a nomological 
machine, it is very likely not strong enough to render most of our law claims 
true. You might put our central point thus: Reference to a nomological 
machine is essential if the cp-clause is to render a law claim true and the 
understanding of just what the nomological machine is that renders the laws 
true is central to a wide range of scientific practices that put our law claims to 
effective use. 
 
Also, some remarks on ‘nomological machine’. Two decades after 
Cartwright’s first work on nomological machines, mechanisms are now a 
widespread topic. In current philosophical discussion ‘mechanism’ has a great 
variety of meanings, from James Woodward’s invariant generalizations to 
step-by-step causal processes to mechanisms like those of William Bechtel, 
Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden,  Carl Craver and Stuart Glennan, where the 
focus is on components and their organisation6. Readers more familiar with 
this later literature on organised component mechanisms can mentally 
substitute these for our ‘nomological machines’ for the purposes of this 
paper7.    
 
2. Nomological machines and the cp-laws to which 
they give rise 
 
A nomological machine is a sufficiently stable arrangement whose features 
(e.g. parts, properties, powers) acting repeatedly in consort can give rise to 
processes and input / output relations sufficiently stable to be the subject of 
cp-laws8. For instance the Solar System, consisting of the Sun and the 
planets, gives rise to the elliptical orbits of the planets described in Kepler’s 
laws. In agriculture, the appropriate application of fertiliser to corn plants can 
increase the crop yield. And when I insert a coin in to the refectory vending 
machine, a can of drink arrives in the output bin shortly afterwards.   
 
                                                 
 
6
 For a useful review of organised component mechanisms see McKay Illari and Williamson, 2012. 
7
 Nevertheless there are differences that matter for different purposes between the various types of 
organised component mechanisms and our nomological machines (as well as many important 
similarities) - we  explore this topic further in a forthcoming paper.   
8
 To aid readability, we avoid labouring distinctions between token and type level nomological 
machines (machine arrangements and change processes) wherever possible. To suppose a change 
process is repeatable is to suppose it to be type-level (and thus associated with a type level machine 
arrangement). Often a token machine can repeatedly instantiate a change process (e.g. a neuron 
depolarising, a cistern producing a flush) by supporting the repeated instantiation of a start 
arrangement. Sometime a nomological machine produces a characteristic change process at most once 
(e.g. a seed germinating, a nebula producing a star). See Cartwright & Pemberton 2012, Pemberton 
2011. 
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     Figure 1 
 
Some of the start-arrangements of the nomological machine give rise to 
change-processes of some characteristic type. The repeated operation of the 
machine can thus give rise to regularities amongst selected aspects of the 
start-arrangements, the change-processes and end-arrangements – 
regularities of the kind we record in cp-laws. 
 
For example, Kepler’s First Law tells us that ceteris paribus the path traced by 
a planet is an ellipse. Newton points to the nomological machine: the planet 
and its sun (i.e. the parts of the machine) gravitationally attracting each other 
on account of their masses, which gives rise to the repeated tracing of an 
ellipse by the planet (the characteristic change process).  
 
Or consider the law that ceteris paribus aspirin cure headache. It is an 
uncontroversial claim of biological science that when this occurs, it is salicylic 
acid in the aspirin which migrates across the stomach wall in to the blood 
stream and then to the brain to act on relevant cells – an instance of this cp-
law cannot occur without an aspirin entering the stomach of a suitable human 
body, i.e. the presence of the relevant nomological machine.   
 
In practice the change which occurs on each run of the nomological machine 
is typically affected by factors external to the start arrangement of the 
machine: to ‘disturbing influences’.  
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     Figure 2 
 
To deal with disturbances we can sometimes extend our characterisation to 
describe a new nomological machine. We include the disturbing influences as 
part of a revised start arrangement, and then consider the revised change 
process to which this revised arrangement gives rise. This extended machine 
may capture more accurately the change which occurs, but the increase in 
specificity of the arrangement can reduce the frequency of instantiation, 
perhaps considerably. In practice, then, such extended machines may have 
limited use. We typically focus on readily repeatable machines and must then 
manage the greater variabilities which occur due to disturbing influences. On 
occasions the disturbing influences may be so great that the characteristic 
change process of the nomological machine does not occur. 
 
Alternatively we can make explicit cp-conditions which rule out factors that 
would disturb the machine significantly enough to disrupt the regularity 
reported in the law. For example in the case of Kepler’s Law, we might extend 
our nomological machine to include other planets in the planetary system and 
perhaps even certain known comets. Doing so increases the accuracy of our 
predictive model, but also makes it considerably more complicated. 
Alternatively we might stick with Kepler’s First Law and focus on the simple 
single planet nomological machine, explicitly ruling out other planets or 
comets in the cp-clause.  
 
 So in addition to what other papers in this volume note, the cp-clause does at 
least these two jobs: it conditions the regularity to an appropriate nomological 
machine and it rules out disturbances that would interfere with the machine in 
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any way that would disrupt the regularity. These two conditions can be 
collapsed into one, so that we can say, for many if not all cp-laws, “ceteris 
paribus L” implies “L holds relative to the successful operation of a 
nomological machine appropriate to produce it.”  
 
3. Using nomological machines and their cp-laws in 
science and technology 
 
In this section we review some key methods used by science in support of its 
claims and practices. We show how these methods use nomological 
machines, and, in particular, how the uses made of the regularities (recorded 
as cp-laws) to which these machines give rise make good sense once their 
origin in the nomological machine is recognised. 
 
In setting up a typical laboratory experiment (e.g. in physics, chemistry, 
biology), parts are brought together and arranged in the right way – placed in 
the right positions and connected in a prescribed manner: a nomological 
machine is constructed. We build a pendulum attached to a timing device, or 
rig up a neuron so that we can stimulate it to fire, or place chemicals in a test 
tube under sterile conditions. The experimenter’s next step is to get the 
machine working in the way anticipated: the pendulum swinging, the neuron 
firing in response to stimulus, the chemicals producing a characteristic 
reaction with the right sort of stages. Now she has a change process of the 
characteristic type, an instantiation of a repeatable experiment: the bob is 
stationary at the start with the string taut, it accelerates moving along an arc 
downwards and reaches its greatest speed at the bottom of its swing. The 
repeatability of the change process supports regularities between changes 
which occur during the change process. The release of the pendulum is 
followed by its movement through the low point of its swing; the stimulus of 
the neuron is followed by the firing of the neuron; the sparking of the 
chemicals is followed by some characteristic reaction.  
 
Producing such a characteristic change process is often a starting point for 
further investigation. The experimenter may now vary aspects of the start 
arrangement or introduce some new influence during the running of the 
machine to see what happens. Typically the change which is made by the 
experimenter is carefully calibrated and is itself repeatable – we can think of 
the magnitude of this change as establishing a setting9 for further runs of the 
machine10. Typically the experimenter explores the relationship between the 
setting and the effect by repeated running of the set-up with differing settings: 
e.g. between the length of the pendulum and its time period, the amount of 
tetanus applied to the neuron and its frequency of firing (and perhaps strength 
                                                 
 
9
 The setting is not a change event which forms part of the change process of the nomological machine, 
but may be a measure of some aspect of such an event or a measure of the magnitude of some cause of 
this change. (see below). 
10
 Where we have a stable machine (e.g. a pendulum) a setting (e.g. the length of the pendulum) once 
changed may continue to apply to further runs of the machine until changed again. 
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of firing), the ratio of chemical inputs and the amount of carbon monoxide 
produced. Where a reliable relationship is established, we suppose the 
machine supports a functional relationship between the identified setting and 
the effect variables. The production of cp-regularities from the machine is 
central to establishing repeatability – and such repeatability of experiments is 
central to the methods of science.  
 
The designer of a piece of technology, like the laboratory experimenter, 
typically brings parts together in some arrangement, perhaps building 
prototypes to see whether a new design does what is hoped. The design may 
be amended to increase speed and reliability, to reduce cost, to make 
manufacture easier, or to meet other objectives. This is an expert process 
centrally concerned with the machine as a whole. 
 
However, many of the most common man-made machines are designed to be 
used by non-experts, people who need have no idea of the details of how the 
machine operates but who can simply follow easy instructions: push the 
button and wait, insert a slice of bread and depress the lever, insert a £1 coin 
in the slot. The human action brings about the start arrangement for the 
change process of the machine, or perhaps the first stage of change, so that 
the later change events of the change process now follow. The user thus 
exploits cp-regularities which arise from the change process the machine is 
designed to support – the action is followed shortly afterwards by some 
change event of the machine: the washing of my clothes, the popping up of a 
slice of toast, or the arrival of a drink in the output bin. 
  
As well as supporting the cp-regularity between the depressing of its lever and 
its popping up of toast, toasters typically also provide a control which can be 
used to set the brownness of the toast. Manmade machines are typically 
designed to allow some settings to be easily controlled to produce outcomes 
relevant to the user. As non-expert users we learn how to adjust the settings 
by reading the manual. The regular association between setting and outcome, 
which can be recorded in a cp-law, is underpinned by the design of the 
machine, e.g. by the reliability of the parts and their secure attachment 
together so as to permit only well-defined movements of the parts. The law 
holds cp - relative to the machine and its proper working, and that fact is well 
known: We do not expect browned toast if we depress the lever on the toilet 
cistern nor if we have smashed the toaster with a hammer.  
 
The cp-laws generated in our controlled experiments and by our technological 
devices come with the nomological machine already given. Generally we are 
not so lucky. We have a host of relatively well-established regularity claims 
that we would like to be able to rely on. But we know them to hold only cp: 
under some specific conditions or other. When are our predictions based on 
these regularities likely to be reliable? If our argument is right, these 
conditions will generally include the proper operation of a nomological 
machine. This, we claim, is reflected in scientific attitudes to the cp-laws and 
the predictions we might make from them. 
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Suppose that some of our experiments concerned with bacteria go wrong – 
the petri-dishes are not correctly sealed, or perhaps they are knocked, and 
the result is a blue-green mess of mould rather than the nice bacterial culture 
intended. Now we have noticed this phenomenon, we might tentatively posit a 
cp-law:  when we have blue-green mould contaminating our petri-dish, certain 
bacteria in the dish die. Initially we may have little or no account of how the 
cp-regularity comes about – so how should we proceed? The next step in a 
typical scientific approach is to try to reproduce the phenomenon: perhaps a 
sample of the mould is isolated and then introduced into a petri-dish 
containing a suitable bacteria culture. Notice how this approach pre-supposes 
that the cp-law arises from a nomological machine – a machine which the 
scientist now tries to reproduce and run repeatedly in order to confirm the cp-
law.  And once this is achieved, the nomological machine is typically 
manipulated to explore its workings: Use differing moulds to see what types of 
mould work. Use differing bacteria to see which are affected. Investigate the 
changes which occur to the mould and the bacteria as the nomological 
machine runs, e.g. does the mould produce chemicals which we can isolate 
and show to be harmful to the bacteria? 
 
Other cp-laws are further removed from the laboratory: The ancient Romans 
knew the cp-law that malaria occurs more frequently near swamps – they 
thought it was due to their production of foul air (hence the name). Effective 
action to control malaria only became possible when the responsible 
nomological machine was identified: the biting of a person by an infected 
mosquito. The proximity of swamps is only relevant as a breeding ground for 
insects. Spraying swamps may reduce the incidence of malaria, but only if we 
spray with the right thing - something that disrupts the relevant nomological 
machine, e.g. something that kills mosquitoes. Alternatively we might use 
mosquito nets or administer oral drugs to disrupt the machine. Here we 
intervene in the blousy world directly, but the methods we use still rely on our 
recognition of the nomological machine which underlies the cp-law.  
 
CP-laws are also common within the bio-sciences. Recent studies of methods 
in this area (e.g. by Bechtel, Richardson, Darden and Craver) show that here 
too the response to a phenomena captured by a cp-law is an investigation 
which typically comprises the search for relevant parts and processes of 
change which underpin the regularity11 – for the relevant nomological 
machine, we say. For example, when we investigate the firing of neurons, we 
discover that ceteris paribus the receipt of neurotransmitter particles is 
followed by a potential difference across the wall at one end of the neuron and 
then the movement of this potential difference along the neuron. The 
scientists investigating this cp-law discovered sodium selective pores in the 
lining of the neuron wall which open and close to control the movement of a 
cloud of sodium ions into and out of the neuron, thus supporting the 
                                                 
 
11
 See for example Bechtel & Richardson’s account of decomposition and localisation methods 
(Bechtel & Richardson, 2010) and the many accounts of the explanatory role of mechanisms (e.g. 
Machamer, Darden & Craver, 2000). 
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propagation of a potential difference along the neuron. Discovering the 
relevant parts and their arrangement is often intimately linked with identifying 
the details of the change processes which occur to that arrangement. In 
practice scientists typically bootstrap to develop their account of the 
nomological machine: they first identify some of the relevant parts and their 
type and some aspects of the change processes – and then they look for 
more parts of the right sort of type, or perhaps develop their account of the 
nature of the change process, proceeding step by step. The identified 
regularity (cp-law) is then associated with the operation of this nomological 
machine – so that here too the nomological machine forms part of the cp-
clause. 
 
The socio-economic world is also a rich source of cp-laws. Here we are often 
focused on types of policy intrusion which aim to improve socio-economic 
conditions. We seek cp-laws of the form: a policy intrusion of type P is 
followed ceteris paribus by a change in some target socio-economic condition, 
measured by variable E. On our account, such policy intrusions typically act to 
change some pre-existing nomological machine.  
 
Consider the example of child malnutrition on the Indian subcontinent. We 
suppose that the nutritional condition of a child arises out of the family context 
which includes the members of the family, the wealth available, and the 
degree of commitment to the child’s well-being and the understanding of 
nutrition within the family. This family context is the relevant nomological 
machine which determines the child’s food intake during their early years and 
hence the child’s nutritional condition. A policy intrusion trialled in Tamil Nadu 
involved giving financial assistance to mothers and educating them about 
child nutrition, e.g. teaching them about the relative benefits of available 
foodstuffs. As in typical well-run policy programmes, the policy intrusion was  
well-defined  and carefully administered, and its effect, the level of 
malnutrition amongst the children of these families, carefully measured. On 
our account this intrusion represents a change in the start arrangement of 
some of the nomological machines (i.e. families with young children) which 
now run in modified form. 
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     Figure 3 
 
In this example, each of the cases in figure 3 represents a family with young 
children, either without policy intrusion (left-hand side) or with the intrusion, 
i.e. financial assistance and education (right-hand side). The results of the 
Tamil Nadu case showed a marked reduction in the level of child malnutrition 
– the policy achieved its aims.  
 
On our account, possible intrusions depend on what amount to hypotheses 
about the nature of the nomological machine: its location, the nature of the 
parts and their arrangement, and the change process which characteristically 
occurs. In the best cases intrusions are designed using knowledge of how the 
nomological machine works.  But what about when these are proposed 
without much knowledge of the underlying machine structure? In that case, 
we had better be very careful. Even if we are able to establish some regular 
association, even a regular causal connection, between something we do and 
some final state of interest, we must always remember that this regularity only 
holds ceteris paribus – relative to the successful operation of a properly 
operating nomological machine appropriate to generate it.  So where we have 
little knowledge of the machine structure and operation, we have little 
knowledge of where that regularity will hold. 
 
This is exactly the kind of problem that arises in the current craze for 
randomised control trials (RCTs) as evidence for genuine causal connections 
in evidence-based policy. The promise is that we can use RCTs to establish 
whether an intrusion genuinely causes a targeted effect, and that we can take 
this as good evidence that the intrusion will produce that effect if we adopt it in 
our setting. Whether it can serve as evidence will though, we know, depend 
on the machine structure in the RCT setting and the machine structure where 
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the policy will be implemented. But that important fact is almost never 
acknowledged.  
 
When the policy intrusions used successfully in Tamil Nadu were reproduced 
in Bangladesh they failed to improve child nutrition levels. Why? In 
Bangladesh it is the mother-in-law who is responsible for family finances and 
food buying and it is the men in the family who do the shopping, so that the 
education of the mother proved ineffective. In Bangladesh policymakers 
sought to make use of the cp-law used in Tamil Nadu without having regard to 
the nomological machine which gave rise to that law. When we consider the 
nomological machines in Bangladesh it is clear they differ in relevant ways 
from those in Tamil Nadu – we should not expect our original cp-law to hold 
there. 
 
The RCT is now a popular form of test for causal relations in situations where 
we have little handle on what the underlying structure is like and what the 
other causes are that can affect the expected outcome given that structure. 
That’s because RCTs can, at least in the ideal, allow us to establish casual 
connections between inputs and outputs with little knowledge of these other 
matters. Often an RCT is chosen to focus on a particular causal factor, for 
example the level of nitrates in the soil as a factor in crop yield. The RCT 
provides a tool to address the problem of possible natural co-variation of 
nitrates with other nutrients that might be responsible for improvements in 
yield: we suppose that if we control and vary randomly the amount of nitrates, 
we can test directly the impact of this factor separated out from the impact of 
any co-variates.  
 
In general, randomisation and masking at all possible points in the experiment 
helps us to address the problems of co-variation, even where the relevant co-
variates are unknown. So we are able to establish a causal principle - but of 
course a ceteris paribus causal principle. And, as we have been arguing, one 
of the central facts the cp-clause refers to is the structure and operation of the 
nomological machine that gives rise to it. So when the nomological machine is 
unknown, the RCT is a tool of very limited use. We can establish a ceteris 
paribus causal law but we have no basis for predicting where it will hold. This 
is particularly problematic for social policy since it is well known that the social 
structures that give rise to causal connections among socio-economic factors 
can vary dramatically even within small geographic regions. An action that is 
bound to cause offense given one social structure can be a required 
politeness in another. 
 
In our view the RCT comes into its own not where we are hugely ignorant but 
rather where we already have a reasonable degree of knowledge about the 
structure of the machine and are probing for more information. For instance, 
as in Figure 3, varying the inputs or bits of the machine structure in controlled 
ways to see what the modified machine structure gives rise to, or  to learn 
more about just what role that particular input or bit of structure plays in the 
overall operation.  
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In this type of research the analyst focuses on arrangements of things of 
specific types, looking for instance for those which can bring about the change 
process which is of interest: fecund families on the Indian subcontinent, 
plantings of corn seeds, humans satisfying certain health criteria. And 
particular attention is paid to the characteristic change processes which occur 
(e.g. child development, crop growth, disease development) and aspect of the 
outcome arrangements at suitable times (e.g. the nutritional health of children, 
crop yield, T-cell levels). How does the analyst know to choose these things 
and these aspects? Their framework of understanding concerns these things 
and how they work, i.e. the relevant nomological machine. Whether they 
articulate it this way or not, their research is developing further knowledge of 
the nomological machine responsible for the cp-regularities under study.  
  
4. Managing variabilities in the machine regularities 
 
Once a machine structure that gives rise to a cp-regularity has been identified, 
the sources of variability within the repeat operation of the machine can then 
be identified as well, thus linking variabilities in machine regularities to the 
ontology of the machine and its context. There may be variation in each of the 
following aspects of the start arrangement, which may influence the precise 
change which occurs: 
 
• Machine parts. Although the things in the start arrangement must be of 
some prescribed type, with prescribed properties/powers, they will vary 
somewhat from case to case (e.g. differing £1 coins, with differing wear 
and tear, may be used in the machine).  
 
• Arrangement of things.  At the start the relevant things must be 
arranged in some prescribed layout, but the exact arrangement may 
vary and still produce the regularity reported in the cp law (e.g. differing 
precise positions of cans in the vending machine). 
 
• Triggering change. Typically a change process is initiated by some 
triggering change. This triggering change may be the receipt of some 
input (e.g. a coin or neurotransmitter particles) or some rearrangement 
of the machine parts (e.g. the pushing of a button, the depressing of a 
lever). The precise quality (e.g. strength, speed, properties) of the 
change within the relevant trigger may vary (e.g. differing styles of 
inserting the £1). 
 
Variabilities can also arise from factors external to the nomological machine, 
from ‘disturbing influences’. These are typically things in the vicinity of the 
machine which have the power to influence the relevant change process (e.g. 
things which jam the moving parts of the machine). 
 
Many cp-laws are useful despite considerable variability, especially in the 
blousy everyday world, where there are typically very many disturbing 
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influences. Where we have a usable regularity, these disturbances are either 
sufficiently infrequent or sufficiently small. Consider a machine designed to 
eject a cricket ball so as to give catching practice, with settings chosen so that 
the machine typically projects the ball over the boundary. On some occasion 
the ball may strike a hapless woodpigeon at mid-off, or be affected by the 
explosion of a nearby hand grenade, so that it does not reach the boundary – 
but such occasions are rare, we suppose. More typically, wind, rain, humidity, 
insects, etc. will vary the exact trajectory of the ball on each occasion but will 
not prevent the ball reaching the boundary. The cp-law that a ball flies off to 
the boundary when the button is pressed is useful despite such considerable 
variability. 
 
However in science, we often seek to limit the degree of variability in our cp-
regularities. Here we focus on circumstances where the disturbing influences 
are severely limited so as to permit the regularity of interest to obtain almost 
without exception: in the laboratory, in well-shielded machines, or perhaps in 
some astronomic or microscopic arrangements.  
 
In the case of laboratory experiments, typical methods for managing 
variabilities include the isolation of the experimental set-up, using parts which 
are of known provenance so as to ensure their relevant quality and thus the 
reliability of their relevant behaviour, ensuring a suitably sterile environment, 
using measurement equipment which is well tested and calibrated elsewhere 
and has been found reliable, and using an expert laboratory technician with 
previous experience to ensure the arrangement is correctly set-up. Each of 
these methods is concerned with managing variations in the machine 
arrangement and its context of the types identified above. 
 
Manmade machines designed for use in the world typically face considerable 
external variabilities – the design will typically include suitable shielding of 
parts, and the use of parts and methods of attachment which can withstand 
wear and tear. But consider our ball-throwing machine: we cannot shield its 
operation from the effect of local woodpigeons, wind, rain, humidity, or insects 
– the machine serves our purpose despite such variation. Nevertheless 
manmade machines are liable to break down sometimes – typically the 
characteristic change process is no longer produced or becomes too variable 
for the purpose at hand. Now we may ask an expert to mend the machine: 
typically we check the parts are still working individually and that they are still 
suitably attached – i.e. no loose screws or bolts. If the machine can’t be 
mended so that it again produces the required change process sufficiently 
reliably, then perhaps we can replace it with a new one.  
 
Some natural nomological machines we can predict with great precision for 
long periods, such as the positions of the planets in the solar system, but 
more typically our ability to predict is limited: e.g. in meteorology, geology, 
economics, medicine. Although we may have some degree of confidence in 
the weather forecast a day ahead, and may find the forecast helpful, we may 
also make contingency arrangement for the occasions on which it is wrong: 
perhaps we take an umbrella. We know where earthquakes are more likely to 
occur and the typical range of their magnitudes, so here we design buildings 
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to withstand shocks. Sometimes our predictive strategies are inadequate: a 
tidal wave damages a nuclear reactor – now perhaps we should review and 
change our strategies, e.g. build a flood barrier.  
 
Statistical and econometric methods typically aim to identify systematic 
sources of variation – causal factors relating to some effect. But we do not 
identify all sources of variation: one way of managing the residual is to use 
probabilities. If the probabilities are sufficiently stable, and the residual 
variation is sufficiently limited, then our model may well be helpful for 
prediction, and perhaps for informing a strategy for control, always keeping in 
mind that what we are learning is tied to the nomological machine at work and 
does not apply at all where some different machine operates or where this 
one breaks down.  So we always need to take care: our predictive 
mathematical models make strong implicit assumptions that the relevant 
nomological machine has stabilities which support the stable functional 
relations of the model and stable probability distributions. In general this is at 
best an approximation, and whether this approximation continues to hold 
during our forecast period is a matter we need to watch closely: if it starts to 
break down then perhaps we look for some change in the circumstances, 
perhaps some new technology or tastes, which could account for this change, 
and update our model. 
 
In practice, knowledge of the type of circumstances in which a particular 
machine arrangement is instantiated, together with experience of the running 
of such machines on previous occasions, often allows identification and 
perhaps quantification of likely variabilities, and perhaps also the control of 
these variabilities as well as identification of where our predictions are totally 
irrelevant because some different machine is at work. Antibiotics may not 
reduce bacteria levels if they are consumed with high levels of alcohol – so 
doctors recommend not drinking when you are taking antibiotics. Educating 
mothers on nutrition is not effective in reducing child malnutrition if they don’t 
have control of buying the family’s food – such education programmes may 
not be recommended in cultures where the mother-in-law controls the 
household.  
 
In general, our aim is not to eliminate variability (although the gravity probe 
experiment illustrates how far we can sometimes go12) but to recognize where 
the machine we have been studying will be found and to manage / control the 
variability sufficiently and to cope with the residual, so that our strategy is 
sufficiently effective in achieving its purpose.  Where the relevant nomological 
machine is not operating or is not sufficiently stable in the right sort of ways, 
our methods are likely to be ineffective. 
 
                                                 
 
12
 See Cartwright, 1989, Section 2.4.2 
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5. In Sum 
 
CP-laws arise from the operation of a nomological machine. So to use such 
laws to good effect, identify the relevant machine and its ontology, we enjoin. 
This is a method used by science with great success to predict and control. It 
provides a principled basis for recognising the relevant causal factors to use 
in our models and also for identifying the factors which must be held constant 
within our cp-conditions. 
 
Because of the way they originate, CP-laws are both local and fragile: they 
hold just where and when the relevant machine is working correctly. The 
successful identification and use of such laws cannot be achieved by 
uncontextual general principles alone, but requires messy contextual 
knowledge, such as the knowledge of the laboratory technician or local 
anthropologist. Our review  illustrates how science, in crafting its methods for 
explicating and using cp-laws, pays careful respect both to the nature of the 
nomological machine, and how regularities arise from its operation.  
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